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Abstract: This article presents the findings of an empirical study into suppliers’ behaviour in 
enforcing EU public procurement law in the UK - where there is a low level of procurement litigation 
– and the factors influencing this. The study indicates that most suppliers have not perceived any 
breaches of EU procurement law. It also indicates that, for cases where problems are perceived, 
recent reforms required by EU law have led to more complaints and legal actions, and enhanced the 
practical effectiveness of remedies. However, the study also reveals important remaining obstacles 
to litigation, in particular the high cost of High Court proceedings, fear of reprisals and (although to a 
lesser extent) the courts’ approach to interim relief. In the light of recent case law, these findings 
have interesting implications for the UK’s compliance with its EU obligations to provide effective 
supplier remedies, and suggest a need to consider a different approach. 
 
1) Introduction 
 
In 1989 the EU adopted Directive 89/665 - the Remedies Directive - on public procurement1, 
providing for effective remedies for suppliers2 before an independent national review body. Action 
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by aggrieved suppliers was seen as the primary method for enforcing EU procurement law,3 and a 
specific directive considered necessary at a time when rules governing national remedies for 
enforcing EU rights more generally was still in an embryonic stage.4 A similar system of remedies was 
later adopted for enforcing the separate rules on utilities procurement5 and defence and security 
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1
 Council Directive of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works 
contracts, [1989] OJ L395/33. This covers procurement within the scope of Directive 2004/18 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, [2004] OJ L134/114, and Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement and repealing Directive 
2004/18/EC, [2014] OJ L94/65.   
2
 For simplicity “supplier” refers here to anyone with an interest in supplying government as a main contractor; 
it is not limited to “suppliers” in the directives’ technical sense of those interested in contracts for supplying 
products (see e.g. art.1(8), Directive 2004/18/EC). 
3
 For the historical context see S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, vol. 1, 3rd edn. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), [3-30]-[3-34].
 
4
 On these principles see P. P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 6
th
 edn. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), chapter 8.  
5
 Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, [1992] OJ L 076/14.  
procurement.6 In 2007 Directive 2007/667 (“the 2007 Directive”) introduced important amendments 
to remedies to enhance effectiveness.8  
 
Whilst in many Member States there has been a flood of cases  - hundreds, or even thousands, 
annually9 - in the UK there is still, however, only a trickle, even after the 2007 Directive. Against this 
background this article presents the results of an empirical study into the system’s use in the UK. 
This sought to gauge the levels of both supplier complaints and legal challenge, and to understand 
the factors that influence this, including the impact of specific features of the UK remedies system 
and the 2007 Directive. One aim was to contribute to an assessment of whether the UK system 
meets EU effectiveness requirements, and the article highlights the study’s main implications for 
this.  
 
                                                          
6
 In Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting 
authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 
2004/18/EC, [2009] OJ L 216/76. See M. Trybus, “The hidden Remedies Directive: review and remedies under 
the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive” (2013) 22 Public Procurement Law Review 135. 
7
 Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council 
Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures 
concerning the award of public contracts, [2007] OJ L335/31. 
8
 See generally J. Golding and P. Henty, “The new Remedies Directive of the EC: standstill and ineffectiveness” 
(2008) 17 PPLR 146; J. M. Hebly (ed.) European Public Procurement Law: Legislative History of the Public 
Procurement Remedies Directive 2007/66/EC (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2011). 
9
 European Commission, Economic efficiency and legal effectiveness of review and remedies procedures for 
public contracts, Final Study Report, MARKT/2013/072/C (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU, April 
2015), 83-84. 
The study indicates that most suppliers seeking public business in the UK have not perceived any 
breaches of EU procurement law to which remedies might be relevant. It also suggests that overall 
the 2007 reforms to the EU’s Remedies Directive have led to more legal actions and complaints, and 
enhanced the effectiveness of remedies in practice. However, the study also reveals important 
obstacles to using remedies in the UK, in particular high cost and fear of reprisals. In addition, 
although to a much lesser extent, a deterrent to challenge is created by various obstacles to 
suspension of contract awards. These findings provide empirical support for arguments that both 
designation of the High Court as the forum for review without access to legal aid, and the approach 
adopted to suspension, may violate EU obligations. Given that recent reforms require legal aid, even 
for corporate entities, where not to grant this would violate EU rights on access to justice, such a 
conclusion may, as we explain, compel the provision of legal aid for procurement cases – a possibility 
that could perhaps drive reform of the UK regime. 
 
From the perspective of EU policy-making our study is timely in that the European Commission has 
been reviewing the operation of the EU remedies system pursuant to an obligation to report to 
Council on the effectiveness of the 2007 Directive10 and under the Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance programme (REFIT),11 and has recently published a report12 (“the Commission remedies 
report”). This could potentially lead to EU-level action to address deficiencies in national systems. It 
needs to be emphasised, however, that the present article contains no implicit endorsement of the 
EU’s current approach. In fact, it is the authors’ view that its premise that supplier remedies should 
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 Art.12A.  
11
 See European Commission, Consultation on Remedies in Public Procurement (July 7, 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-
databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=8244&lang=en&title=Consultation-on-Remedies-in-Public-
Procurement. 
12
 Commission remedies report, n 9 above. 
be the main enforcement tool is questionable. Related to this, we consider that remedies should be 
limited to cases of serious fault in view, in particular, of the uncertain and complex nature of the 
procurement rules and the detrimental impact on the procurement function that results from the 
combination of this with the threat of litigation. Elaboration of this view is beyond the scope of this 
article, but it is mentioned to highlight that our findings do not necessarily entail the further 
conclusion that the EU should act mainly to enhance the effectiveness of the UK remedies system; 
they merely provide information to assist in developing a sound strategy to the extent that judicial-
type remedies are desirable (as we believe is the case for serious fault). 
 
 From the perspective of domestic public law, our study contributes to the developing literature on 
the role of judicial remedies,13 in this case from the specific perspective of use of remedies and 
barriers to access. The focus being on access to justice, we do not address the wider question of the 
actual impact of these remedies on compliance, but other research provides evidence of explicit 
consideration of the likelihood of, and likely impact of, litigation in compliance decisions in public 
procurement in the UK.14 We also do not consider what other mechanisms and influences affect 
                                                          
13
 See, in particular, S. Halliday, Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative Law  (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2004); G. Richardson, “Impact Studies in the UK” in M. Hetogh and S. Halliday (eds), Judicial Review 
and International Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004); V. Bondy  and M. Sunkin, The Dynamics of Judicial Review Litigation: The resolution of public law 
challenges before final hearing (The Public Law Project, 2009).                                              
14
 As to which see P. Braun, “Strict Compliance versus Commercial Reality: The Practical Application of EC 
Public Procurement Law to the UK's Private Finance Initiative” (2003) 9 European Law Journal 575. Cf K. 
Gelderman, P. Ghijsen, and J. Schoonen, “Explaining Non-compliance with European Union Procurement 
Directives: a Multi-disciplinary Perspective” (2010) 48 Journal of Common Market Studies 243.  
compliance,15 either at EU level or in the UK context. However, against the background of our 
findings on obstacles to legal remedies this is an interesting area for future research. 
 
The analysis commences in section 2 by outlining the requirements of the EU Remedies Directive 
and their transposition in UK law, and examining problems relating to compliance with that Directive 
in the light of recent CJEU case law on access to justice. Section 3 explains the methodology of the 
empirical study. Section 4 then explains the study findings and their implications for the UK’s 
compliance with the Directive. Section 5 concludes. 
 
For the most part the remedies rules are the same under all the remedies legislation and for 
simplicity we generally refer only to the Remedies Directive.16 We also refer generally only to the 
legislation in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, namely the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 
(PCR 2006)17 (applicable during 2009-2012, the study period) and Public Contracts Regulations 2015 
                                                          
15
 A positive influence on compliance for both organisational pressures and expected gains was found by K. 
Gelderman, P. Ghijsen, and J. Schoonen, ibid. But cf C.J. Gelderman, P.W. Ghijsen, and M.J. Brugman, “Public 
procurement and EU Tendering Directives? Explaining Non-compliance” (2006) 19 International Journal of 
Public Sector Management 702; and see L. Ramsey, “The new Public Procurement Directives: a Partial Solution 
to the Problems of Procurement Compliance” (2006) 12 European Public Law 275, arguing for a focus on 
cultural change. For a recent UK study of influences on public law compliance in a different context (roads 
maintenance) see S. Halliday, “The Governance of Compliance with Public Law” [2013] Public Law 312.  
16
 On the differences in the defence regime see Trybus, n 6 above. 
17
 SI 2006/5, extensively amended by the Public Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2992) to 
implement the 2007 Directive. Unless otherwise explained (see, in particular, the discussion of time limits), 
references here are to the version of PCR 2006 as amended by this 2009 instrument, as at the date of entry 
into force, which was the version of the PCRs applicable for the study.  
(PCR 2015),18 the latter applying (with some exceptions) from 26th February 2016.19 Differences in 
Scotland20 are mentioned only when relevant. 
 
2) EU requirements on remedies and UK implementation: a legal analysis from the perspective of 
access to justice21 
 
a) General   
The Remedies Directive, first, requires a system to ensure that decisions may be reviewed 
“effectively” and “in particular” as rapidly as possible22 by any person having or having had an 
interest in obtaining a contract and who has been, or risks being, harmed.23  
 
In view of the purposes of the Directive of both promoting the public interest in open markets and 
protecting tenderers so that they are not deterred from participating,24 the general effectiveness 
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 SI 2015/102, transposing Directive 2014/24/EU and retaining the same remedies. 
19
 PCR 2015, s.118.  
20
 Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/88); Utilities Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2012 (SI 
2012/79); Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1848). 
21
 See S. Treumer and F. Lichère (eds), Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Copenhagen: DJØF 
Publishing, 2011); S. Arrowsmith (ed.), Remedies for Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules (Earlsgate, 1993); 
D. Pachnou, “Enforcement of the EC Procurement Rules: The Standards Required of National Review Systems 
under EC Law in the Context of the Principle of Effectiveness” (2000) 9 PPLR 55; and, on the UK, M. Trybus, “An 
Overview of the United Kingdom Public Procurement Review and Remedies System with an Emphasis on 
England and Wales”, in Treumer and Lichère (eds), above, 201-234. 
22
 Remedies Directive, art.1.  
23
 Remedies Directive, art.1(3).  
24
 As indicated in the Remedies Directive, recitals 4 and 5. 
requirement seems to entail effectiveness from the perspectives both of enforcing the public 
interest and protecting suppliers’ rights (the latter being also a means to secure the public 
interest).25 The Directive is to be interpreted in this regard in the light of art.47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union guaranteeing access to justice,26 which, in view of the 
purpose of the Directive’s purpose of providing access to justice to suppliers, probably means that 
the standards of the Charter and the EU’s remedies legislation in procurement largely converge.27 
The standards of effectiveness that follow probably go in certain respects beyond those applicable 
for enforcing EU rights in general  – and which apply to contracts outside the scope of the Directive -  
although how far is not clear.28 The application of these principles in the context of specific aspects 
of remedies is examined further below. 
 
In addition, the Remedies Directive restates29 the general EU principle requiring remedies no less 
favourable than those for enforcing equivalent provisions of domestic law.30   
                                                          
25
 The latter being the means to secure the public interest: see Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen 
delivered on 7 May 7 2015 in Orizzonte Salute - Studio Infermieristico Associato v Azienda Pubblica di Servizi 
alla persona San Valentino - Città di Levico Terme and Others (C-61/14) (ECLI:EU:C:2015:307), [21].  
26
 Orizzonte Salute (Judgment) (ECLI:EU:C:2015:655), ibid, [48]-[49].  
27
 Orizonte Salute (AG Opinion), ibid, [34].  
28
 See, in particular, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jääskinen delivered on 7 July 2015 in Consorci Sanitari del 
Maresme v Corporació de Salut del Maresme i la Selva (C-203/14) (ECLI:EU:C:2015:445), [16]; see the 
discussion in Pachnou, n 21 above; and Wall AG v La ville de Francfort-sur-le-Main and Frankfurter 
Entsorgungs- und Service (FES) GmbH (C-91/08) [2010] ECR I-2815, indicating more limited remedies in cases 
not covered by the Remedies Directives.   
29
 Remedies Directive, art.1(2), as interpreted in Commission v France (C-225/9) [1999] ECR I-3011. Equivalent 
provisions can be found in Directive 92/13/EEC, art.1(2), and Directive 2009/81/EC, art.55(3).  
 b) Forum for review  
The review powers required under the Remedies Directive must be exercisable by judicial bodies or 
similar independent bodies.31 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland the designated forum is the 
High Court;32 in contrast with many Member States33 there is no specialist review body, although 
some expertise in that many cases are heard by the Technology and Construction Court. In Scotland 
proceedings can be brought, however, either in the Court of Session or the Sheriff Court, the latter 
providing a less expensive forum.34 
 
A notable feature of using the High Court is expense.35 Court fees themselves were, during the study 
period, generally only a maximum of £2000 (for damages claims, depending on size),36 and lower for 
other claims, which are more common. However, from March 2015 the maximum for damages 
claims was raised to £10 000 (for unlimited claims or those exceeding £200 000), with a fee of 5 per 
cent of value for claims between £10 000 and £200 000,37 although again fees are much lower for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
30
 See generally Craig and De Búrca, n 4 above, 246-250; and in relation to procurement in particular Orizonte 
Salute (AG Opinion), n 25 above, [26].  
31
 See Remedies Directive, art.2(9). 
32
 PCR 2006, reg.47C(2); PCR 2015, reg.91(2). 
33
 For example, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Sweden. On other Member States see Treumer and Lichère, n 21 
above, and the country fiches in the Commission remedies report, n 9 above.  
34
 See C. Boch, “The Implementation of the Public Procurement Directives in the UK: Devolution and 
Divergence?” (2007) 16 PPLR 410.  
35
 Unless stated otherwise, this section is based on information on costs obtained by the authors in 2015 from 
five UK solicitors. 
36
 These varied little during the study period. 
37
 The Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2015 (SI 2015/576). 
non- damages claims, starting at £480 for most review proceedings.38 Overall litigation costs, 
however, are very high, primarily because of the need to pay costs of both solicitors and counsel, 
which are high both because of the amounts charged39 and the complex nature of High Court 
proceedings. The short standstill and limitation periods (discussed below) mean that suppliers incur 
high costs at an early point when they have limited access to information. To obtain more it is often 
necessary to make an early application for specific disclosure, which alone may cost £25K - £50K. UK 
legal practitioners responding to the Commission40 indicated a median overall cost of “a typical 
review case”41 for clients of about 130 000 Euros, varying little by contract size - about twice the 
median for the Member States with next highest costs42 - whilst information obtained for our own 
study43 indicates average costs of £35 000-£100 000 for a suspension hearing (the stage at which 
most disputes are resolved) and from £350 000 up to £2 million for a case reaching final judgment.44 
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 Although additional fees may be payable for further steps. 
39
 See J. Diamond, The Price of Law (Centre for Policy Studies, 2016), 
www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/160202103206-ThePriceofLaw.pdf.  
40
 Five in the UK. 
41
 In the wording of the questionnaire sent to legal practitioners (not published, but on file with the current 
authors). This will presumably have been interpreted as including cases that do not proceed to judgment but 
this is not known.  
42
 See Commission remedies report, n 9 above, 124 and also Appendices to Final Report, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/studies-networks/index_en.htm, s 3.  
43
 From four solicitors firms experienced in procurement litigation. 
44
 Of this roughly three quarters is solicitors costs and one quarter barristers’ costs, court and other costs 
accounting for around three per cent. 
Legal aid was not in practice conceivable in this context during the study period,45 although 
conditional fee arrangements and “after the event” insurance were both available to some degree.46  
As we will see below, these high costs of litigation operate as a substantial barrier to access to 
review. 
 
The Remedies Directive does not contain any specific rules on litigation costs. However, on court 
fees, the CJEU recently ruled in Orizzonte Salute that these are national “procedural rules” subject to 
the San Giorgio47 principle that such rules must not render practically impossible or excessively 
difficult the exercise of rights EU rights,48 and that “in addition” fees must not “compromise the 
effectiveness” of the Remedies Directive.49 The Court in Orizzonte Salute referred to art.47 of the 
Charter50 under which, as Advocate General Jääskinen pointed out, it is clear that court fees may 
constitute a hindrance to access to justice51 (at least where not covered by legal aid). Applying these 
rules, the CJEU indicated that fees depending on contract value are acceptable in principle, and that 
                                                          
45
 Being unavailable for companies or even generally individuals for breach of statutory duty, other than by 
way of judicial review: Access to Justice Act 1999, c. 22 and now under Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment 
of Offenders Act 2012, c. 10.  
46
 The authors are grateful to Stuart Brady for information on this. 
47
 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio (199/82) [1983] ECR I-03595. 
48
 Orizonte Salute (Judgment), n 25 above, [46]. 
49
 Orizzonte Salute (Judgment), n 25 above, [47], as established in Universale-Bau and others v 
Entsorgungsbetriebe Simmering (C-470/99) [2002] ECR I-11617.    
50
 Orizzonte Salute (Judgment), n 25 above, [49]. 
51
 See eg Teltronic-CATV v. Poland (App. no. 48140/99) (ECHR, 10 Jan 2006), [48], and Stankov v Bulgaria (App. 
no. 68490/01) (ECHR, 12 Jul 2007) (concerning art.6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms).  
fees not exceeding two per cent of the value, as in that case, are lawful.52 The Court did not give any 
indication of the legality of higher basic fees, or fees such as the 5 per cent of claim value applied in 
the UK for damages claims. The CJEU notably rejected an argument that fees may be rendered 
unlawful as discriminatory because of their particular impact on suppliers with weaker financial 
capacity - mainly Small and Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).53 The CJEU also ruled that levying 
multiple and cumulative fees “within the same administrative judicial proceeding” is acceptable, but 
only where “the subject matter of the actions or supplementary fees are in fact separate and 
amount to a significant enlargement of the subject matter”.54 The Court itself did not elaborate on 
this, but the Advocate General considered that the basic unit for judicial protection is the contract 
award procedure.55 This implies that cumulative fees related to a single award procedure should be 
assessed as a whole, covering those relating to both suspension and other remedies (even in 
separate courts) and supplementary measures, such as access to documents.56 Further, the 
Advocate General elaborated that court fees may violate the Charter and hence the Remedies 
Directive when they render access to the review body “economically unviable”, even when they 
pursue legitimate aims such as financing the court system.57  
 
It is less clear how far the existence of other costs, notably lawyers’ fees, can infringe the Remedies 
Directive, including whether it is relevant to consider the extent to which they are attributable to 
government – whether because of the procedural rules applied, organisation of the legal profession 
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 Orizzonte Salute (Judgment), n 25 above, [58]-[65]. 
53
 Orizzonte Salute (Judgment), n 25 above, [62]-[64]. 
54
 Orizzonte Salute (Judgment), n 25 above, [74]. 
55
 Orizzonte Salute (AG Opinion), n 25 above, [52]. 
56
 Both relevant in Orizzonte Salute (AG Opinion), n 25 above, [58]. 
57
 See Orizzonte Salute (AG Opinion), n 25 above, [50]-[51].  
and/or the designation of the High Court for review.58 Such issues have not been resolved in the case 
law, including under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms59 which is relevant under the Charter.  
 
Closely connected to both issues is the fact that art.48(3) of the Charter explicitly refers to legal aid 
as an element of access to justice,60 a provision relevant for legal persons, as well as natural, 
persons,  in civil proceedings.61 Whether legal aid is required depends on factors such as the subject 
matter of the litigation, including its economic importance; what is at stake; the complexity of the 
law and procedure; and the capacity of the applicant to represent itself62 - although it may also be 
relevant whether the applicant is a profit-making company.63 Some of these factors can certainly be 
invoked to support an argument that, to the extent that the costs of High Court litigation make it 
economically unviable given the nature of the undertaking and contract size, legal aid is sometimes 
required to avoid infringing the Remedies Directive. It is not clear, however, how far the CJEU will be 
                                                          
58
 Advocate General Jääskinen in Orizzonte Salute (n 25 above) suggests that court fees might be unlawful if 
combined with lawyers’ fees they make challenge economically unviable. Potential liability for high costs 
incurred by the contracting authority may also be relevant; see Commission v United Kingdom (C-530/11) 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:67) (published in the electronic Reports of Cases (Court Reports - general)).   
59
 Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, Fair Trial Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), [11.382].  
60
 See S. Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford: Hart, 2014), 
[47.226]-[47.243]. 
61
 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-279/09) 
[2010] ECR I-13849. 
62
 DEB, ibid, [61]; GREP GmbH v Freitstaat Bayern (C-156/12) (ECLI:EU:C:2012:342) published in the electronic 
Reports of Cases (Court Reports - general – “Information on unpublished decisions” section).  
63
 DEB, ibid, [62]. 
willing to go in this direction and in giving a steer to national authorities on how to apply these 
factors in specific situations, including in light of budgetary considerations.64 
 
A pertinent point in the present context, however, is that the cost of assisting litigants could be 
addressed by establishing alternative review fora. The argument for alternative fora could also be 
made in other areas of law, requiring the CJEU to adjudicate in each area on whether benefits of 
judicial fora outweigh the financial costs – but these are sensitive issues impinging on national 
budgetary and policy choices and involving difficult evidential questions which the CJEU has 
generally steered away from addressing directly.65 It is possible, however, that the CJEU might side-
step such  broader issues by addressing the cost of procurement litigation not via principles 
concerning the linked questions of affordability of national judicial systems and legal aid for 
commercial litigation in general, but via the Remedies Directive’s explicit requirement for 
effectiveness as requiring an economically accessible review forum in public procurement – which 
could presumably be provided (at the choice of Member States) either by supporting review through 
legal aid or by designating a low-cost forum. The CJEU’s willingness to take this step with 
                                                          
64
 It has been suggested that classification of art.48(3) as relating to procedural rules reduces the scope for 
arguments based on budgetary considerations (Peers et al, n 60 above, [47.241]). Clearly, however, budgetary 
considerations are recognised de facto in the above legal rules on legal aid, and also in the costs case law 
where financing of the court system is a recognised interest - see Orizzonte Salute (Judgment), n 25 above, 
[73]-[75]. This is in line with the CJEU’s general recognition of budgetary justifications for national measures de 
facto if not de jure: see J. Snell, “Economic Aims as Justification for Restrictions on Free Movement” in A. 
Schrauwen (ed), Rule of Reason: Re-thinking Another Classic of EC Legal Doctrine (Europa Law Publishing, 
2005) 52; S. Arrowsmith, “Rethinking the approach to economic justifications under the EU's free movement 
rules” (2015) 68 Current Legal Problems 307.   
65
 See Snell, ibid; Arrowsmith, ibid; N. Nic Shuibhne and M. A. Maci, “Proving Public Interest: the Growing 
Impact of Evidence in Free Movement Case Law” (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 965.  
procurement may be bolstered by the widespread and increasing use in the EU of specialist review 
bodies as a means to comply with the Remedies Directive.66  
 
From the UK perspective it is now significant that since 2012 one exceptional situation in which legal 
aid is available even for companies is where failure to provide it would breach Convention rights 
(within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998) or enforceable EU rights to the provision of legal 
services,67 including art.47 of the Charter.68 Thus if designating the High Court as a review forum 
without legal aid would violate the Remedies Directive, it appears that legal aid would potentially be 
available, so avoiding any actual violation. Were it established that the current approach indeed 
violates the Remedies Directive in the absence of legal aid, the implications for the legal aid system 
could provide an inducement to consider alternative approaches for procurement disputes, either to 
reduce pressure on the court system or, more likely, to replace it with a cheaper alternative. 
  
As well as having cost implications, designation of the High Court as the review forum has 
consequences for the time for completing proceedings. In this regard, the Remedies Directive 
includes an express requirement for remedies to be “rapid” because of the particular importance of 
this in procurement, first, avoiding undue disruption to public projects and, secondly, ensuring that 
the opportunity for a direct remedy is not prejudiced by the conclusion, or even performance, of the 
contract. These points are closely connected since the greater the disruption to projects the more 
problematic it is to maintain a suspension. Most Member States set specific time limits for review 
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 n 33 above. 
67
 LASPO Act 2012, n 45 above, Sch 3, para 3. 
68
 Legal Aid Agency, Lord Chancellor’s Exceptional Funding Guidance (Non-Inquests), (9 June 2015) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/legal-aid-exceptional-case-funding-form-and-guidance, [31]–
[35]. 
bodies to resolve procurement cases69 but the UK has not done this. Court judgments and anecdotal 
evidence indicate that the Court and parties often make strenuous efforts to ensure that 
procurement cases are concluded rapidly (with expedited trials),70 and a current project of the 
Procurement Lawyers’ Association (PLA) aims to help formalise this by developing a civil procedure 
protocol for procurement.71 However, it is generally difficult to complete cases in less than a few 
months and the Commission remedies report found a median length for first-instance pre-
contractual, non-interim proceedings of only just under 300 days – the sixth longest in the EU (with 
the five states with longer proceedings all also using judicial fora).72  As we will see, this has led to a 
reluctance to suspend procurement decisions.  
 
c) The standstill obligation73 
An important feature that supports access to remedies is a standstill period – that is, a delay 
between notification of the award (with reasons) and conclusion of the contract, allowing time for 
challenge. This was included in the 2007 Directive,74 building on the CJEU’s decision in Alcatel75 
which concluded effectiveness entailed a standstill.76 Prior to Alcatel nothing appeared to prevent a 
regulated entity from concluding a contract without notifying the award decision. Combined with a 
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 Commission remedies report, n 9 above, section 5.7; this applies to 16 Member States with specified periods 
from 15 days to two months. 
70
 See, for example, recently Solent NHS Trust v Hampshire County Council [2015] EWHC 457 (TCC), [36]. 
71
 The PLA has set up a working group for this purpose: see 
http://www.procurementlawyers.org/projects.aspx.  
72
 Commission remedies report, n 9 above, s 5.7, fig 6.7. 
73
 See further, in particular, Golding and Henty, n 8 above. 
74
 2007 Directive, n.7 above, art.2, adding this provision in Remedies Directive, art.2a. 
75
 C-81/98 Alcatel Austria v Bundeministerium für Wissenschaft und Verkehr [1999] ECR I-7671. 
76
 As interpreted in C-444/06 Commission v Spain [2008] ECR I-02045.  
general rule that Member States may limit remedies to damages once a contract  is  concluded, 
which still applies77 and which has been adopted in the UK,78 this meant that suppliers could be 
deprived of any chance to challenge the award directly, a possibility open to abuse. The UK 
regulations introduced the standstill obligation after Alcatel, recasting it slightly in 2009 following 
the 2007 Directive.79 In general the UK’s required standstill period is ten calendar days from 
notification,80 the minimum allowed by EU law.81    
 
d) Interim measures and automatic suspension 
Remedies Directive art.2(1)(a) requires review bodies to have the power to take interim measures 
aimed at correcting infringements or preventing further damage, and the 2007 Directive added82 an 
obligation for automatic suspension once a legal challenge is instituted that prevents any conclusion 
of the contract prior to a decision of a review body either on interim measures or on the review 
action.83 Combined with the standstill, this aims to secure for suppliers a real opportunity to 
overturn unlawful decisions, in particular without this being lost or prejudiced by the contract’s 
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 Remedies Directive, art.2(7). 
78
 PCR 2006, reg.47J and PCR 2015, reg.98. 
79
 PCR 2006, reg.32A; PCR 2015, reg.87.  
80
 15 days when notification is other than by fax or electronic means. PCR 2006, reg.32A(2) and PCR 2015, 
reg.87(2); and see PCR 2006 reg.32A(6); PCR 2015 reg.2(4).  
81
 UK authorities must supply automatically with the standstill notice more information than EU itself requires 
(the full information required on request under Directive 2014/24, art.55(2), rather than merely a summary of  
that information as required by the Remedies Directive itself). 
82
 Remedies Directive, art.2(3) and (4), added by the 2007 Directive, art.1. 
83
 Or before the end of the standstill period: Remedies Directive, art.2(3). 
conclusion. The UK regulations provide for this.84 However, as EU law permits, the UK courts have 
power to lift the automatic suspension.85  Both in awarding interim measures86 and lifting automatic 
suspensions87  the courts have almost invariably applied the “American Cyanamid” principles that 
govern interim measures in other domestic contexts,88 rejecting an argument that automatic 
suspension implies a presumption in favour of maintaining a suspension.89 However, the fact that 
suspension of conclusion of the contract is now automatic places the onus of taking action in 
relation to suspension on the procuring entity rather than supplier. 
 
Application of American Cyanamid entails, first, that if there is not a serious case to be tried, a 
suspension will not be granted/maintained – a limitation clearly permitted under EU law, especially 
in light of the low threshold test for this in UK law.90 
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 PCR 2006, reg.47(8); PCR 2015, reg.96(1)(c) and (d) and (automatic suspension) PCR 2006, reg.47G; PCR 
2015, reg.95.   
85
 PCR 2006, reg.47H(1); PCR 2015, reg.96(1).   
86
 In numerous cases, and assumed to apply without discussion by the CA in Letting International v London 
Borough of Newham [2007] EWCA Civ 1522. 
87
 Exel Europe v University Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust [2010] EWHC 3332. 
88
 As set out in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (No.1) [1975] AC 396. On possible differences of approach 
in Scotland see Patersons of Greenoakhill v South Lanarkshire Council [2014] CSOH 21 where the court, 
however, specifically declined to decide whether the position is different. 
89
 Exel, n 87 above. 
90
 CS Communications Systems Austria v AUV (C-424/01) [2003] ECR I-03249. On application of the threshold in 
domestic see, in particular; Newcastle upon Tyne Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Newcastle PCT  [2012] 
EWHC 2093; Bristol Missing Link Ltd v Bristol City Council [2015] EWHC 876 (TCC). 
Secondly, if damages would provide the challenger with an adequate remedy the court will deny/lift 
a suspension,91 at least in England, Wales and Northern Ireland92 (and even if damages are not 
adequate, their availability is a consideration in the overall assessment of the balance of interests, as 
discussed below).93 The application of this adequacy of damages condition provides the backdrop for 
the empirical study, but it is submitted that it is in fact incompatible with the Remedies Directive,94 
particularly in light of Alcatel, which indicates95 that the Directive requires not merely an effective 
system of remedies but, specifically, an effective remedy to overturn unlawful decisions. Denying 
suspension - and hence any real opportunity to overturn a decision96 - because of an alternative 
damages remedy seems inconsistent with this.97 Even if an adequacy of damages condition is 
                                                          
91
 Examples are numerous, one early case being McLaughlin and Harvey v Department of Finance and 
Personnel (No.1) [2008] NIQB 25, [9]-[10]; and on automatic suspension see eg Exel, n 87 above and NATS v 
Gatwick Airport [2014] EWHC 3133. This involves a discretionary assessment, the outcomes of which are hard 
to predict and often difficult to reconcile: contrast, for example, Covanta Energy Ltd v Merseyside Waste 
Disposal Authority [2013] EWHC 2922, where a tender had been submitted for specific work, with the cases 
cited in n 98 below. 
92
 On Scotland see n 88 above. 
93
 National Commercial Bank Jamaica v Olint Copr [2009] 1 WLR 1405, 1409, [17]. 
94
 Sue Arrowsmith, “Enforcing the Public Procurement Rules: Legal Remedies in the Court of Justice and the 
National Courts” in Arrowsmith (ed.), n 21 above, 67, and S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities 
Procurement, 2
nd
 edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), [21-60]. See also F. Banks and M. Bowsher, 
“Damages Remedy in England & Wales and Northern Ireland”, in D. Fairgrieve and F. Lichère (eds), Public 
Procurement Law: Damages as an Effective Remedy (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 62-74.  
95
 Alcatel, n 75 above, in particular [33]-[34] and [38].  
96
 Since, as noted, this is generally ruled out in the UK once the contract is concluded. 
97
 Note that the General Court has accepted an adequacy of damages condition in proceedings against the EU 
institutions (see e.g. Esedra Sprl v Commission (T-169/00R) [2000] ECR II-2951) which are in general subject to 
equally stringent remedies standards as the Member States (Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany (C-46/93) 
 
acceptable in principle, it is doubtful whether the way in which it has been applied is lawful, given 
that suspension is often denied despite significant uncertainty over the amount or existence of 
loss.98 Further, even if suspension is not required from a supplier’s perspective, it seems necessary to 
protect the EU interests in open markets.  There is in fact support for a different approach in early 
case law: thus in Harmon Judge Humphrey Lloyd suggested, obiter, that effectiveness required 
various modifications to the American Cyanamid principles, including rejecting an adequacy of 
damages condition,99 whilst in Partenaire100 and in Henry Brothers No.1101 Coghlin J effectively 
reached the same outcome by different reasoning, stating that damages cannot be “adequate” 
because of the public interest and requirement for injunctive relief as the primary remedy. 
Moreover, in OCS102 the Irish High Court recently interpreted the applicable Irish regulations103 as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
[1996] ECR I-1029; Bergaderm (Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques) SA v Commission (C-352/98P ) [2002] ECR I-
5291, [41]; however, differences in procurement may be explained by the fact that the Remedies Directive 
does not apply to the EU institutions.  
98
 E.g. when the challenge concerns admission to multi-supplier framework agreements under which no 
specific work is guaranteed e.g. McLaughlin and Harvey, n 91 above; European Dynamics v HM Treasury [2009] 
EWHC 3419; and see also Exel, n 87 above, where no tender had been submitted.   
99
 Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v The Corporate Officer of the House of Commons (1999) 67 Con LR 1; (2000) 
2 LGLR 372; [1999] EWHC 199, [235]; and see also BFS v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWHC 1513. 
100
 Partenaire v Department of Finance and Personnel [2007] NIQB 100, [31] (High Court (QBD) of Northern 
Ireland). 
101
 Henry Brothers (Magherafelt) Limited and others v Department for Education for Northern Ireland (No.1) 
[2007] NIQB 116. 
102
 OCS One Complete Solution Limited v Dublin Airport Authority plc and Maybin Support Services (Ireland) Ltd 
(Notice Party) [2014] IEHC 306. 
rejecting American Cyanamid104 in favour of a more general balance of interests test, one reason 
being that the adequacy of damages condition was considered incompatible with EU law.105 
However, surprisingly given the academic view and this early case law, arguments against the 
adequacy of damages condition were ignored for many years in most106 UK cases. In 2014 OCS was 
referred to in NATS,107 but the High Court there dismissed the arguments with no real 
consideration.108 In 2014 in DWF109 the Court of Appeal expressly declined to examine the issue, 
stating itself “content to apply the American Cyanamid principles”110 as this made no difference to 
the outcome. The position thus remains uncertain.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
103
 The European Communities (Award of Contracts by Utility Undertakings) (Review Procedures) Regulations 
2010, SI 131 of 2010. The case concerned utilities but is equally relevant for other cases covered by EU 
remedies legislation. 
104
 Which applies in Ireland in other contexts: Campus Oil v Minister for Energy (No. 2) [1983] IR 88. 
105
 The case went to the Supreme Court ([2014] IESC 51) which did not, however, consider the issue since it 
decided that the regulations did not allow the lifting of a suspension at all. This has led to the Irish regulations 
being amended to allow this, but without clarifying the governing principles: see European Communities 
(Public Authorities Contracts) (Review Procedures) (Amendment) Regulations 2015, SI 2015 No 192; European 
Communities (Award of Contracts by Utility Undertakings) (Review Procedures) (Amendment) Regulations 
2015, SI 2015 No 193. 
106
 An exception was European Dynamics v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 3419, where the argument was raised 
but briefly dismissed on the (fallacious) basis that if it were accepted ‘public procurements would grind to a 
halt’ ([22]). 
107
 NATS, n 91 above. 
108
 [29]. The Court has since continued to apply American Cyanamid without discussion, sometimes citing NATS 
(n 91 above) e.g. Group M v Cabinet Office [2014] EWHC 3659, [14]. 
109
 DWF LLP v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, acting on behalf of the Insolvency Service 
[2014] EWCA Civ 900. 
110
 DWF, ibid, [47]. 
 Were a strict adequacy of damages condition ruled out, it would still be important to consider how 
far availability of damages could be one relevant factor. Remedies Directive art.2(5), stating that the 
review body may “take into account the probable consequences of interim measures for all interests 
likely to be harmed, as well as the public interest” and decide not to grant such measures when their 
negative consequences could exceed their benefits implies that all interests can be taken into 
account to some degree. However, giving weight to availability of damages in an overall assessment 
differs only in degree from an adequacy of damages condition, and it is submitted that some limits 
exist on consideration of this factor. It is not clear how far the CJEU could review the overall impact 
of discretionary assessments by national review bodies, however, and any EU-level limit on national 
discretion is perhaps likely to take the form of rules to govern the exercise of discretion, such as a 
presumption in favour of the interest in open markets – something which we saw above was 
expressly rejected, however, in domestic case law on automatic suspension.  
 
In addition, suspension will normally be denied unless the supplier undertakes to compensate the 
procuring entity111 for losses, or at least certain losses, should the claim fail112 (the cross-undertaking 
in damages), this is not an automatic bar to relief under the American Cyanamid principles113 or the 
PCRs. Again, it has been argued, however, that to require such an undertaking infringes the 
effectiveness principle114 both in general and in its application in specific cases, because of the 
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 The same approach will apply when an undertaking is sought by others tenderers: see n 122 below.  
112
 Such undertakings are expressly contemplated in PCR 2006, reg.47H(3) and PCR 2015, reg.96(3) (as 
interpreted in Halo Trust v Secretary of State for International Development [2011] EWHC 87).  See, for 
example, Partenaire, n 100 above. 
113
 Belize Alliance of Conservation of Non-Governmental Organisations v Dept of the Environment (BACONGO 
case) [2003] 1 WLR 2839, PC. 
114
 Arrowsmith (2005), n 94 above, [21-65].   
deterrent effect on legal proceedings – a view endorsed, obiter, in Harmon115 and also in OCS.116 
Some of these arguments are bolstered by the 2014 CJEU ruling in Case C-530/11 Commission v 
United Kingdom117 concerning art.9(4) of the Aarhus Convention, stating that litigation on 
environmental matters should not be “prohibitively expensive”, a requirement arguably analogous 
to the Remedies Directive’s constraints on financial cost of litigation, as interpreted in Orizzonte 
Salute. The CJEU considered that the financial risk for the claimant must be taken into account,118 
arguably implying substantive constraints on the amount of potential liability, geared to the 
claimant’s resources. The CJEU also indicated the need for certainty in the rules on cross-
undertakings;119 thus arguably it is not permitted to leave this to discretionary judicial assessment, 
as currently applies in procurement cases. 
 
If none of these considerations precludes suspension, the court examines the overall balance of 
convenience. This includes weighing, inter alia, the effect of delay on the public interest120 and other 
tenderers121 (including, in both cases,122 the extent of protection through a cross-undertaking), the 
                                                          
115
 n 99 above, [253]. 
116
 OCS One Complete Solution Limited v Dublin Airport Authority plc and Maybin Support Services (Ireland) Ltd 
(Notice Party) [2014] IEHC 306. 
117
 Commission v United Kingdom (C-530/11), n 58 above. 
118
 ibid, [59] (Judgment). 
119
 ibid, [71] (Judgment). 
120
 For recent examples see Group M, n 108 above; Advanced Business Software and Solutions Ltd v The 
Pirbright Institute [2014] EWHC 4651 (TCC); Solent NHS Trust, n 70 above. 
121
 E.g. Solent NHS Trust, n 70 above. 
122
 In DWF, n 109 above, the CA indicated that the latter interests would not be considered if they could have 
been protected by the tenderers obtaining their own undertakings [54]. 
countervailing public interest in open markets,123 the impact on the challenger of refusing 
suspension124 (taking into account, as we have seen, the damages remedy), and the strength of the 
case125 - a balancing exercise envisaged by Remedies Directive, art.2(5). Whilst there are some cases 
in which suspensions have been applied in spite of damage to the public interest that cannot be fully 
compensated,126 in about two thirds of cases127 suspension is rejected,128 with the public interest in 
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 E.g. R v HM Treasury, ex p Edenred [2014] EWHC 3555 (TCC), [31].   
124
 E.g. Federal Security Services Ltd v Chief Constable for the Police Service of Northern [2009] NICh 3 (where 
this favoured a suspension); and Rutledge Recruitment and Training v Department for Employment and 
Learning [2011] NIQB 61  (where it counted against a suspension). 
125
 E.g. BFS, n 99 above; DeVilbiss Medequip Ltd v NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency [2005] EWHC 1757 
(Judgment of the High Court (Lewison J) of 29 July 2005).  
126
 For example, Partenaire, n 100 above; Covanta, n 91 above; Edenred, n 123 above, where the court 
emphasised public interest in the rules (para.31).  The court in Harmon, n 99 above, obiter, also indicated that 
it would have suspended the procedure if that had been sought, and see also DeVilbiss, n 125 above, [64].  
There have been several suspensions where damage from delay was negligible or non-existent eg Lettings 
International v London Borough of Newham [2007] EWCA Civ 1522, First4skills Ltd v Department for 
Employment and Learning [2011] NIQB 59, Morrison Facilities Services Limited v Norwich County Council (2010) 
EWHC 487 (Ch). 
127
 That is, cases where the court considers the balance of interests. 
128
 Suspension have been lifted/denied, or would have been if necessary to decide, on the basis of the balance 
of convenience in 22 of 30 cases since 2002. From Jan 2013-Oct 2015 suspensions were, or would have been, 
lifted on the balance of convenience in eight cases and were maintained in four: see (in favour of lifting) Group 
M, n 108 above; Pirbirght, n 120 above; and Solent NHS Trust, n 70 above; NP Aerospace Limited v Ministry of 
Defence [2014] EWHC 2741; Allpay Limited v Northern Ireland Housing Executive [2015] NIQB 54; Fox Building 
and Engineering Ltd v Department of Finance and Personnel (No 2) [2015] NIQB 72; Patersons, n 88 above; 
Hastings & Co (Insolvency) Ltd v The Accountant in Bankruptcy [2013] ScotsCSOH 55; Lowry Brothers v 
Northern Ireland Water No.2 [2013] NIQB 23; Resource (NI) Limited v University of Ulster [2013] NIQB 64; and 
 
proceeding carrying much more weight than the (more nebulous) open market interest (although in 
many of these decisions availability of damages to the challenger, even if not “adequate”, was a 
factor). In the same way that giving this factor significant weight might contravene the Remedies 
Directive so also might this be the case with an approach that routinely favours the public interest in 
proceeding, based again on arguments that direct redress is the primary remedy129 and that the 
system overall must protect the public interest, as well as suppliers.  
 
 
e) Set aside 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(in favour of maintaining) see NATS, n 91 above, DWF¸ n 109 above, Edenred¸ n 123 above; Bristol Missing Link, 
n 90 above. In the study period 2002-2012 there were 12 cases in which suspensions were refused/lifted based 
on the balance of convenience (or would have been had it been necessary to decide) and five in which 
suspensions were granted/maintained (or would have been but for other factors). For the former group see  
Henry Bros no 1, n 101 above; Lion Apparel Systems v Firebuy Limited [2007] EWCH 2179 (Ch);  BFS, n 99 
above;  DeVilbiss, n 125 above; Newcastle NHS Foundation Trust, n 90 above; Shetland Line (1984) Limited v 
Scottish Ministers [2012] CSOH 99; Elekta Limited v The Common Services Agency [2011] CSOH 107; Rutledge 
Recruitment and Training v Department for Employment and Learning [2011] NIQB 61; The Halo Trust, n 112 
above; Indigo Services v The Colchester Institute Corporation [2010] EWHC 3237; Alstom Transport v Eurostar 
International Limited, Siemens Plc [2010] EWHC 2747 (Ch); Exel, n 87 above. For the former group see 
First4skills, n 126 above; Federal Security Services Ltd v Chief Constable for the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland [2009] NICh 3 (where, however, the adequacy of damages condition prevailed); Lettings International, 
n 126 above; Partenaire, n 100 above; Rapiscan Systems v Commissioners of HM Revenue and Customs [2006] 
EWHC 2067. 
129
 This view finds some support in McLaughlin and Harvey, n 91 above, [16]. 
One remedy required to be available at trial is a set aside of any unlawful decision.130 UK case law is 
limited, as cases rarely proceed beyond suspension; however, it is established that factors similar to 
those applying to suspension are relevant, including adequacy of damages and the public interest in 
proceeding.131 From the perspective of effectiveness, this approach is open to the same objections 
as apply to the approach to suspension, especially in light of the Alcatel ruling that set-aside must be 
effectively available. As with suspension, the High Court has also specifically rejected the existence 
of a presumption in favour of the remedy.132 
 
 
f)  Concluded contracts, ineffectiveness, and related sanctions 
As noted, the Remedies Directive permit states to limit suppliers to damages only following 
conclusion of the contract,133 as has been done in the UK,134 but the 2007 Directive added the 
standstill obligation coupled with automatic suspension to ensure an opportunity of challenge 
before any contract is concluded. To support this, the 2007 Directive additionally introduced an 
                                                          
130
 PCR 2006, reg.47(8), and PCR 2015, reg.97(2). The Utilities Remedies Directive, n 5 above, art.2(1)(c) and (5) 
allows for an alternative approach of dissuasive payments but this alternative has not been applied in the UK. 
131
 Severn Trent Plc v Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig (Welsh Water Limited) & Ors [2001] EuLR 136; Mears v Leeds City 
Council (second judgment) [2011] EWHC 1031. 
132
 Severn Trent, ibid. 
133
 Remedies Directive, art.2(7). 
134
 PCR 2006, reg.47(9); PCR 2015, reg.98(2). 
exception to the sanctity of contracts principle, by requiring that contracts be declared ineffective135 
in two cases,136 namely:  
 
a) When the contract was awarded without the required publicity.137 This aims to secure an 
opportunity to challenge for this kind of serious violation (to which the standstill is not 
relevant).138 
 b) When there is a violation of the standstill or automatic suspension,139 coupled with some 
other breach affecting the supplier’s chance of obtaining the contract,140 and where the 
former violation has deprived the supplier of the chance of starting or completing 
proceedings. This ensures that the opportunity to challenge is not undermined by the 
entity’s failing to adhere to the very rules that aim to preserve that opportunity. 
                                                          
135
 Subject to an exception for overriding reasons for public interest: Remedies Directive, art.2d(3) (as 
amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2); PCR 2006, regs.47L; PCR 2015, reg.100.  
136
 See Golding and Henty, n 8 above; M. Clifton, “Ineffectiveness – the new deterrent: Will the Remedies 
Directive ensure greater compliance with the substantive procurement rules in the classical sectors” (2009) 18 
PPLR 165. 
137
 Remedies Directive, art.2d(1)(a) (as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)); PCR 2006, regs.47K(2) and 
47J(2)(a)); PCR 2015, reg. 99(2).  
138
 This does not apply when the entity publishes a “voluntary ‘ex-ante’ transparency (VEAT) notice” indicating 
in its intention to rely on one of the exemptions from publicity and followed by a period of delay, where 
certain conditions are met, thus allowing an opportunity for challenge: Remedies Directive, art.2d(4) and 3a 
(as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2) and (4)); PCR 2006, regs.47K(3) and (4); PCR 2015, reg. 99(3) and (4).  
139
 Remedies Directive, art.2d(4) and 3a (as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)); PCR 2006, reg.47K(5); PCR 
2015, reg.99(5). 
140
 Remedies Directive, art.2d(4) (as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)); PCR 2006, reg.47K(5)(d); PCR 2015, 
reg.99(5)(d). 
 Ineffectiveness in UK law is prospective only,141 as allowed by the Remedies Directives,142 with the 
detailed consequences being left to the Court’s discretion.143 
 
The 2007 Directive also introduced new penalties of fines and contract shortening to strengthen the 
remedies system in the kind of serious situations targeted by ineffectiveness remedy.144 
 
g) Damages145 
The Remedies Directive also requires a damages remedy,146 probably including lost profits.147 The 
PCRs in the UK provide for this remedy,148 which is based on principles of tort, requiring the supplier 
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 PCR 2006, reg.47M(1); PCR 2015, reg.101(1)). 
142
 Remedies Directive, art.2d(2) (as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)). 
143
 PCR 2006, reg.47M(3); PCR 2015, reg.101(3); and see also PCR 2006, reg.47M(4); PCR 2015, reg.101(4). 
Parties may alternatively agree on consequences in advance: PCR 2006, reg.47M(5)-(6), PCR 2015, reg.101(5)-
(6).  
144
 Thus the court must impose a fine when a prospective-only declaration of ineffectiveness is made:  
 Remedies Directive, art.2d(2) (as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)). It must also provide for one of these 
penalties when ineffectiveness is not declared for various reasons: Remedies Directive, art.2d(3) (as amended 
by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)); PCR, 2006 reg.47N(2)(a) and 47N(3); PCR 2015, regs.102(2)(a) and 102(3). ON level 
of penalties see Remedies Directive, art.2e(2) (as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)); PCR 2006, reg.47N(4)-
(5); PCR 2015, reg.102(4)-(5). 
145
 See, in particular, Fairgrieve and Lichère, n 94 above.  
146
 Remedies Directive, art.2(1)(c). It is unclear whether the right to damages under EU law itself is conditional 
on a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ but anyway such a condition does not apply in the UK: EnergySolutions v 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority [2015] EWCA Civ 1262. 
to be put in the position as if the breach had not occurred. In Harmon149 the held that damages are 
available on the basis of either loss of chance,150 where the supplier shows a substantial chance of an 
award, or full lost profits where the supplier show that it “would have” won the contract (satisfied in 
that case by showing a 90 per cent chance)151 -  a robust remedy compliant with EU obligations. 
 
h) Time limits for proceedings 
The original Remedies Directive did not deal expressly with time limits for bringing proceedings, but 
the 2007 Directive introduced a specified minimum time period, corresponding with the length of 
the standstill, (generally) 10 calendar days with from the day after notification of the decision and 
the reasons for it.152 Prior to 2009 the UK regulations required proceedings to be brought “promptly” 
and in any case within three months of an infringement, with a judicial discretion to extend for good 
reason (amended slightly in 2009 to attempt to meet the requirements of the 2007 Directive).153 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
147
 Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Combinatie Spijker Infrabouw v Provincie Drenthe (C-568/08) [2010] ECR I-
12655, [110]. Details of the damages remedy are not specified other than the Utilities Remedies Directive 
providing expressly for recovery of tender costs in certain cases: The Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006 (SI 
2006/6), reg.45(8); Utilities Remedies Directive, art.2(7). 
148
 PCR 2006, reg.47(8)(b) and (9); PCR 2015, reg.97(2) and 98(2)(b). 
149
 Harmon, n 99 above. 
150
 Rejected for lack of a causal link between breach and loss in Nationwide Gritting Services v Scottish 
Ministers (No.2) [2014] ScotsCS CSOH 151. 
151
 Applied also in Aquatron Marine v Strathclyde Fire Board Outer House [2007] CSOH 185.  
152
 The period is longer (based on 15 days) when notification is given other than by fax or electronic means: 
Remedies Directive, art.2c (as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)). 
153
 PCR 2006, reg.47D provided that, where based on a decision, proceedings were not required to be started 
before the end of 10 days following the date the decision was sent, when accompanied by a summary of the 
 
“Promptly” required action within a few days in the context of an on-going award procedure.154 
These were the time limits stated to apply for most of the period of the empirical study. However, 
they were later revealed by the CJEU in Uniplex not to comply with EU law.155 In particular Uniplex 
indicated that: i) a requirement for promptness is too uncertain; and ii) a time limit cannot run until 
the supplier knows or ought to know of the infringement. Thus the time limits were amended by the 
Public Procurement (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2011,156 applicable for the most part 
from 1 October 2011.157 In general, proceedings must now be started within 30 days from when the 
supplier first knew, or ought to have known, that grounds for proceedings had arisen.158 As before, 
the Court may extend the general period for “good reason”,159 but not beyond three months from 
the date of knowledge/constructive knowledge.160 “Good reason” does not cover a case where a 
supplier does not know about the regulations or holds off from legal action for fear of damaging the 
relationship,161 or has been trying to persuade the entity to change its mind or is having a complaint 
investigated by the Commission,162 but exists when the entity has misled the supplier.163 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reasons for the decision, or the day after the date on which the supplier was given the summary (with slight 
variation for communications sent other than by facsimile or electronic means). 
154
 Holleran v Severn Trent Water [2004] EWHC 2508. 
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 Special time limits apply for ineffectiveness claims164 -  as EU law allows,165 proceedings in the UK 
must be brought within six months of the date of contract166 but there is also effectively a 30 day 
cut-off from when supplies have reasons for decisions.167  
 
3) The empirical study: methodology 
As mentioned, the empirical research sought to gauge the level of supplier complaints and challenge 
activity, and to identify the factors influencing this, including key features of the remedies system 
described above. Data was collected using a structured questionnaire from (1) solicitors in private 
practice, (2) procuring entities and (3) suppliers. The collection of overlapping data helped both to 
verify the accuracy of data, and to provide a more complete picture (for example, only suppliers can 
provide information on situations in which they do not litigate or complain at all). Participants could 
respond anonymously or, if willing to participate in follow-up questioning, could identify themselves. 
 
Solicitors were invited via the Procurement Lawyers’ Association (PLA)168 and 18 of 96 member-
firms169 participated. Participants’ experience covered all main types of procurement (construction, 
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 Remedies Directive, art.2f(2) (as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)). 
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 Remedies Directive, art.2f(1)(b) (as amended by 2007 Directive, art.1(2)). 
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 PCR 2006, reg. 47E(2)(b); PCR 2015, reg.93(2)(b). 
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169
 Participants in all groups were asked to liaise with colleagues and submit one response. 
main types of services, and standard and complex supplies). Eleven had more than ten years’ 
experience, thus covering the remedies system prior to the 2009 changes.170 Regulated procuring 
entities were identified using Contracts Finder (the national website for public procurement 
information)171 and 119 responded with a good spread amongst the main types of regulated 
entity,172 other than utilities, and with all main types of procurement covered by a significant 
number. 114 suppliers participated, again identified through Contracts Finder. Information from the 
74 non-anonymous supplier participants showed that all but one173 were SMEs.174 They again 
covered all main categories.175 Fifty three (46 per cent) had more than ten years’ experience with 
public/utility sectors. Fifty eight indicated that 100 per cent of their business was in the UK and only 
13 that 50 per cent or more of their business was elsewhere. There was, however, no significant 
variation in responses between these groups. Suppliers’ views were especially important since they 
have direct knowledge of the factors affecting complaints and challenges, and the questionnaire 
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 Of other participants six had four to ten years of experience. 
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 https://online.contractsfinder.businesslink.gov.uk/ where buying organisations are listed at 
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 12 central government bodies; ten non-departmental public bodies; 45 local councils; 12 schools or 
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 Using the definition in Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (notified under document number C(2003) 1422) (2003/361/EC). 
175
 With most categories covered by a significant number of respondents, although fewer had been involved in 
purchasing supplies and utilities than services and construction (with more involved in professional and 
complex services than manual). 
responses were therefore explored with semi-structured telephone interviews with 35 responding 
suppliers (20 of whom had more than 10 years’ relevant experience).176  
 
4) Findings 
 
  
a) Levels of activity: legal challenges proceeding to a judgment, challenges instituted, and 
incidents of advice not leading to challenge      
A first question examined was the number of legal challenges proceeding to at least one judgment 
(including on suspensions).177 Figure 1 presents the annual numbers.178 Prior to 2006 judgments 
were rare and sporadic; the number then generally increased up to 2011 but peaked at only 22 in 
2011, and then fell – probably because many of the 2010/11 cases concerned a single set of 
tendering exercises concerning publicly-funded legal services and did not represent any general 
trend. This number is very low in comparison with many Member States: the Commission’s remedies 
report179  shows that the vast majority of Member States have hundreds or even thousands of 
procurement cases annually,180 only six had fewer than one hundred in 2012, and only Ireland fewer 
than the UK. 
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  Nine had four-10 years’ experience, four had one-three years’  and two less than a year. 
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 Examined through the judgments in the Westlaw UK database (Sweet & Maxwell).  
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 Cases are included in the year of the date of the latest judgment in the case. The figures here for 2009-2011 
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 Not necessarily involving violations of EU procurement law itself. The UK has only a tiny number of 
procurement cases that do not involve such violations, however.  
 Figure 1 - Number of UK cases concerning breach of EU procurement law that result in a judgment 
 
The research also explored the overall number and pattern of legal challenges.181  The number 
settled or withdrawn182 was examined via data from the lawyers, which indicated that the 
overwhelming majority do not proceed to final judgment. Twelve of the 16 lawyers with information 
reported that more than 50 per cent of cases did not do so, with 10 reporting that more than 70 per 
cent of cases did not do so and six that this was so in more than 90 per cent of cases . Changes over 
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 The number of reported cases above includes those where there is a judgment other than a final judgment 
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time were examined through information from lawyers183 on the number of challenges dealt with 
from 2007-2012,184 in relation to both supplier and procuring entity clients. The data, which appears 
to have a high level of accuracy,185 shows a steady, and similar, year-by-year, increase: for supplier 
clients there was a rise from an average of 0.8 incidents in 2007 to three in 2012, and for procuring 
entities a rise from 0.7 to 3.9. Thus the number more than tripled - a trend broadly in line with the 
rise in reported judgments. 
 
The study also explored the level of incidents in which suppliers sought external legal advice but did 
not institute a challenge. Here data from lawyers showed that for every case of advice that produced 
litigation, about four to six cases did not. The findings also indicate186 that suppliers are increasingly 
seeking advice: there was a steady rise of incidents from an average 4.7 for each law firm in 2007 to 
13 in 2012 – almost a tripling. This is in line with the trends in litigation and legal challenge examined 
above. 
 
b) Reasons that suppliers who seek legal advice or make complaints do not litigate 
 
i) Introduction 
As just seen, the overwhelming majority of suppliers seeking legal advice decide not to litigate and 
the study explored the reasons for this. In addition, we examined whether suppliers also make other 
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 Although legal challenges could theoretically be dealt with solely by internal advisors. 
184
 A small number of participants provided data for years preceding 2007 - four for 2006 and 2005 and two for 
2006 only, indicating two challenges in 2006 with none noted for previous years. 
185
 Based on information supplied on the accuracy of data and records. 
186
 This data can be considered as reasonably accurate based on information supplied on accuracy. 
complaints to procuring entities187 which do not result in litigation, and why, if so, litigation is not 
pursued.  
 
Lawyers’ input was relevant only where suppliers sought legal advice, whilst input of suppliers and 
procuring entities was potentially relevant also for situations where suppliers had complained 
without any legal advice. 25 of 114 responding suppliers had sought legal advice or made one or 
more other complaints, although almost were involved in only one or two such incidents, or one or 
two annually.188 36 of the 119 responding procuring entities had experienced one or more 
complaints; 13 had received only one and five two complaints, but 14 three to ten, and four more 
than ten (and two 20 or more). The three groups were asked to assess the relevance of certain 
defined reasons for suppliers’ decisions on whether to make a legal challenge, as well as to identify 
any other reasons. Procuring entities expressed definite views on one or two points but generally 
felt unable to assess the reasons, so that the study findings here rest mainly on data from lawyers 
and suppliers. 
 
The findings, which were consistent between these two groups, indicate a variety of reasons for not 
commencing proceedings. The most important, which were about of equal significance - and the 
same for decisions taken with legal advice as without - concerned the cost and adequacy of legal 
remedies, and fear of reprisals.  In addition, decisions were significantly influenced by the existence 
of a non-confrontational legal culture, by action taken by the procuring entity, by the fact the 
complaint was not well-founded, and by difficulties of proof.  
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 A complaint was defined in the questionnaire as a formal “complaint (e.g. following a process set out in 
tender documents) to the procuring public body/utility over a possible breach of procurement law, short of 
‘legal challenge’”. (legal challenge also being defined).  
188
 Exceptions were one respondent with about three complaints a year and another with ‘too many to recall’. 
 ii) Cost and nature of legal remedies 
As noted above, reasons relating to legal remedies were one of the two most important influences. 
As regards the different aspects of remedies, the cost of proceedings and desire to focus resources 
elsewhere were most important. Difficulties with maintaining/obtaining a suspension were also 
relevant. The delay involved in legal proceedings was a consideration, but less significant. Finally, 
also relevant important were the time limits for bringing proceedings but, as we have seen, these 
have already changed since the study period.  
 
iii) Cost and need to use resources elsewhere 
Research by Pachnou in the 1990s189 identified litigation costs as one of the two most significant 
deterrents to legal remedies, and the present research confirmed its importance.  
 
Lawyers regarded this as more important than difficulties with specific remedies, although not as 
important as time limits (see below). Fourteen of 18 lawyers responding said that cost was relevant 
to the decision not to litigate in at least 25 per cent of cases and seven considered it relevant in 
more than half. Financial cost was given even more prominence by suppliers, who identified this as 
one of the three main factors of roughly equal importance the others being inadequate remedies 
and fear of reprisals (see below). In fact, 17 of 20 suppliers who had sought legal advice or 
complained – and all for whom this was a potentially pertinent issue - referred to cost.190  One 
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 D. Pachnou, “Bidders’ Use of Mechanisms to enforce EC Procurement Law” (2005) 14 PPLR 256. 
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 15 stating that it was relevant in 76-100 per cent of cases, but were often commenting on only one or two 
incidents. Of the three who stated that it was not relevant this was because of considerations such as 
correction of the breach.  
specifically mentioned that cost precluded litigation despite the possibility of insurance, although 
another perceived that availability of insurance might lead to more litigation in future.  
 
Also very important was the similar consideration of wishing to focus resources elsewhere: fifteen of 
eighteen suppliers considered it relevant, 12 of them in more than 75 per cent of cases.191 A large 
number of comments referred to the need to devote resources to finding other opportunities – for 
example, “I could be better serving my firm by just forgetting it, walking away from it and spending 
that time on chasing new work…” – and the interviews also showed this to be an overwhelming 
consideration for many.  
 
Several suppliers commented both on the fact that the public sector seemed willing to incur high 
costs to deal with the cases and the risk of being liable for those costs if the claim fails. Typical was 
the view that “Very specialised small companies don’t have the resources to take on the government 
machine”. The general perspective of suppliers on the remedies system was summed up thus: “The 
remedies system does [not] have any real effect in the case of SMEs. It only is a 'remedy' for vast 
companies with deep pockets and clever lawyers”. Combined with uncertainties of outcome (see 
below) the overwhelming general sentiment was that “the commercial risk to business from seeking 
a remedy is seen to far outweigh any benefit of successfully achieving a remedy” - and many 
referred explicitly to the need to avoid “throwing good money after bad”. 
 
iv) Legal remedies, time-limits and delay 
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 Nine lawyers considered it relevant in at least 25 per cent  of cases and four in more than half 
Lawyers were quizzed on the influence of specified features of the remedies system. However, it was 
considered that suppliers and procuring entities would often not understand these, and thus (apart 
from on delay) their views were sought merely on remedies in general.192  
 
According to lawyers, several elements of the remedies system influenced suppliers not to institute 
proceedings after legal advice. As noted, most important – and perhaps more so than any other 
single reason, including cost – was the time limit for challenge: eight of 18 lawyer participants 
considered this relevant in at least 25 per cent of cases and four in more than half, and a further five 
in two-25 per cent of cases. Lawyers, but not suppliers themselves, perceived time limits as even 
more important – a difference possibly explained by the fact that time limits appear relatively more 
important to suppliers who have sought legal advice who will have an awareness of these.  As 
explained, the explicit time-limits for most of 2007-2011, to which most experience related, in fact 
did not comply with EU law, and have been amended.193 Another reason for not bringing legal 
proceedings, although much less significant, was the difficulty of securing suspension. Ten of the 18 
lawyers considered this relevant, with five finding it relevant in more than 25 per cent of cases (and 
two in more than half). Similar importance was attached to the rules on undertaking in damages.194 
A good few – seven of 18195 – also considered that even if the contract was not likely to be 
concluded by the trial remedies would be inadequate and that this was a reason for not litigating.  
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  Whether it was a factor that ‘your organisation believed it would not be able to obtain suitable remedies 
even if a breach of the law was shown’. 
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 Interestingly, three lawyers suggested that time limits are now a more important reason for not litigating; 
but one commented that the new time limits have led to an increased number of ‘precipitous’ writs to avoid 
being out of time.  
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 Nine of the 18 lawyers considered this relevant, five finding it relevant in more than 25 per cent of cases 
(three in more than half). 
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 Two considered this relevant in 51-75 per cent of cases, two in 25-50 per cent and three in 2-25 per cent. 
 Suppliers’ own responses similarly suggested that inadequacy of remedies is a factor: the vast 
majority of 18 responding thought it relevant in 76-100 per cent of cases196  and none considered it 
irrelevant – although the one supplier with significant experience of complaints, considered this 
relevant only in 51-75 per cent of cases.  In fact, suppliers identified this factor as one of the three 
main factors of roughly equal importance in decisions not to litigate, along with cost and fear of 
reprisals. A number of interviewees stated that they are not interested in compensation but only in 
obtaining the work, indicating that it is the perceived difficulty of obtaining a remedy to ensure latter 
that is the key issue.  
 
Finally, the time for completing legal proceedings was perceived relevant by both lawyers and 
suppliers, although in far fewer cases than the reasons above.197  
 
v) Fear of blacklisting and other reprisals 
Another very significant factor deterring legal challenge was fear of reprisals from the procuring 
entity. Suppliers considered this one of the three most significant reasons for not litigating, along 
with cost and inadequate remedies: all 18 responding referred to it.198 Many interviewed expressed 
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 Two in 51-75 per cent of cases, and five saying they did not know. Many were commenting here only on 
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considered it not to be relevant, however, including the one supplier with significant experience of complaints.  
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 14 considering it relevant in 76-100 per cent of cases although reflecting in some cases only one or two 
incidents. 
a fear of blatant blacklisting – for example “You just have to take it, it’s not a legal decision – you 
might win the case …….but you’ll never win any business with that local council again – you know it 
and they know it”, and “In local government it’s almost regarded as you will be put on a blacklist if 
you make any waves at all”. For a few, however, the concern was more about losing positive 
opportunities for good relationship:  “We are interested in longer term partnerships…. focusing on a 
partnership and strong relationship and an adversarial approach does not set us off on the right 
foot”. Fear of reprisals from other entities was also not negligible although regarded as a little less 
important. This is clearly a concern, however, in small markets: “I’ve lived in [redacted] for over 25 
years … if you go down that road you’ll never get any business. It’s too small. The client base is too 
small and if you did start complaining you’ll not get any business – it would go round the place like 
wildfire”.   
 
Lawyers also indicated that fear of reprisals was important to suppliers, although they did not give it 
quite the same importance as the concrete considerations above, nor the same importance as 
suppliers did.199  Since, however, suppliers were addressing not only cases in which legal advice had 
been sought but complaints more generally, the latter point is unsurprising, since suppliers that have 
consulted lawyers already would naturally seem  likely to be less influenced by this fear. 
 
vi) Action by the procuring entity 
Although use of the remedies system is clearly, then, often affected by problems with the system or 
its use (reprisals), another common reason for not proceeding following a complaint is that the 
procuring entity takes action. Of course, the possibility of proceedings and hence, possibly, the 
effectiveness of remedies, may influence the entity’s action.    
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 Nine of 18 considered it relevant in at least 25 per cent of cases (four in more than half of cases) and of 
similar perceived relevance was a fear of reprisals from other regulated purchasers.  
 In this regard direct corrective action, such as rewinding the procedure or reinstating a supplier, was 
often relevant. Lawyers considered this not quite as important as cost but still very significant. Thus 
13 of 18 indicated that this influenced supplier decisions in at least 25 per cent of cases, six 
considering it a factor in more than half. Three of 13 suppliers addressing this also referred to this, 
commenting that it was quite common – for example, “A fault with a process – never a problem – 
the government department will stop and revisit it. I can’t think of any government department who 
would stand up and carry on”. Suppliers responses seemed to give a bit less weight to this than 
lawyers’ - but lawyers’ responses relate only to cases in which legal advice had been sought, when 
action may be more likely, and also, although two thirds of suppliers assessing the issue did not 
experience any action by the procuring entity as relevant,200 most were commenting on only one or 
two incidents. Further, 13 of 28 procuring entities reported direct corrective action as relevant.   
 
Other action – for example, an apology (the illustration given in the question) or change in policy - 
was also cited by 11 of 18 lawyers as a factor,201 though much less important than direct corrective 
action, and also by 5 of 14 suppliers and 18202 of 23 procuring entities who addressed this – the 
latter groups suggesting that such other action is more important than direct correction. Again, the 
difference might be explained by the fact that lawyers are addressing only cases in which they have 
already become involved.  
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 This was the case with 10 of 13 suppliers (corrective action), 10 of 11 (compensation) and nine of 14 (other 
steps such as an apology). 
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 Four stating that it was relevant in 26-50 per cent of cases and seven that it was relevant in two-25 per 
cent. 
202
 11 indicating such measures to be relevant in 76-100 per cent of cases. 
These responses clearly indicate that many complaints are addressed by the procuring entity to the 
satisfaction of complaining suppliers – a point reinforced by the fact that the supplier with extensive 
experience of complaints was influenced by corrective action or other steps (other than 
compensation) in 51-75 per cent of cases.   
 
Compensation, however, was much less important.203 This was considered relevant by only two 
lawyers and obtained by only one of eleven suppliers addressing this, and none of the procuring 
entities had paid any. This figure, alongside the very limited number of successful reported damages 
claims204 and the limited number of cases in which compensation is the reason for terminating 
litigation (see below), indicates a much smaller role for compensation than for other remedies. One 
reason could be that, as noted earlier, many suppliers are not interested in compensation but only in 
obtaining work. 
 
vii) A weak or uncertain legal case 
As might be expected, the weakness or uncertainty of a case was also often a reason not to litigate – 
as mentioned above, this fact combined with cost issues was often perceived to make litigation a 
poor choice. First, suppliers are not always able to find out the facts to establish a breach.205 
Obviously it is not clear whether this operates as a barrier to successful proceedings. Several 
suppliers commented on the difficulty of proving the facts when there has been a “fix”. Secondly, 
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 See Harmon, n 99 above and Aquatron Marine, n 151 above.  
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 Sixteen lawyers cited this (10 saying as a factor in more than 25 per cent of cases) and eight out of 16 
suppliers. 
legal uncertainty also deters litigation.206 Thirdly, suppliers often conclude there has been no legal 
violation.207 Some also referred to uncertainty as a factor rather than concluding that there was no 
breach because they had not sought legal advice and were unsure of the legal position. Finally, 
suppliers seeking legal advice quite often decided not to litigate because of a low chance of success 
despite a breach - for example, where the award decision is not affected. This was more common 
than the situation in which the supplier concluded after advice that there was no breach.208 In 
addition, suppliers indicated that they did not bring legal action because the breach was trivial.209  
 
viii) Non-confrontational legal culture 
Pachnou’s study found the fact that there is a non-confrontational legal culture in this field to be an 
important reason for not litigating;210 legal action was considered generally an undesirable feature of 
business, and to be avoided as disruptive to the business community. In the present study suppliers 
and procuring entities also gave this consideration some significance: five out of 12 suppliers who 
responded thought it relevant and six out of 12 procuring entities. As one supplier expressed it 
“You’re not looking for minor breaches. There is goodwill around. You know people and you’re trying 
to win a contract… In England businesses just want to get on with it” and another: “I don’t think that 
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 13 of 18 lawyers considered this relevant with one regarding it as relevant in more than half of cases and 
five in more than a quarter; and 12 of 17 suppliers. 
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 12 of 18 lawyers referred to this, with one regarding it as relevant in over 75 per cent of cases, three in 
more than half and another four in more than a quarter; and four out of 11 suppliers who replied on this 
stated it was relevant. 
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 Cited by 14 of 18 lawyers, with 12 stating it relevant in at least 25 per cent of cases and six in more than half 
of cases. Fifteen of the 17 suppliers likewise considered it a factor, suggesting that it is also more relevant than 
the other factors above in their experience. 
209
 Five of 13 responding mentioned this and nine of 18 lawyers; and 30 of 31 procuring entities.  
210
 Pachnou, n 189 above. 
legal challenge is a sensible way forward in a business relationship – I don’t think any company 
unless it’s been severely wronged, or it’s a massive contract or it’s a last throw of the dice … it just 
doesn’t strike me as anything that would be worth considering”. Lawyer participants did not 
consider this factor to be so important,211 but, of course, their experience covers only cases where 
legal advice has been sought - a confrontational situation already. 
 
ix) Complaint as a “pressure” tactic 
Finally, a further factor was use of a complaint as a tactical weapon to pressure procuring entities 
without any serious intention to litigate. Two of 12 suppliers indicated that they had used 
complaints/threat of litigation in this way and 18 of 22 procuring entities perceived this to have 
happened. 
  
c) Reasons legal challenges do not proceed to judgment 
Using a similar approach, the research also examined why the vast majority of legal challenges are 
not carried through to final judgment.212 The main source of information was lawyers, as responding 
suppliers and procuring entities had very limited experience of litigation (as might be expected given 
its rarity). Only one supplier, involved in three cases over a decade, had any experience, and only 
four procuring entities had been subject to challenge.213  
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 Only six of 18 considered it not relevant and five of these considered it so in fewer than a quarter of cases. 
212
 i.e. asking for an indication of the significance of defined reasons/other reasons for not proceedings, but 
with only lawyers asked to rate specific aspects of legal remedies. 
213
 Two to one challenge and the other two to three each. 
Reasons for discontinuing challenges were similar to those for decisions not to initiate them. 
However, the relative significance of the various reasons was quite different at the two stages, as 
might in fact be expected.  
 
In this regard, the single most significant reason for terminating litigation (although far from 
overwhelmingly important) was direct corrective action. Nine of the 16 lawyers with challenge 
experience considered this relevant in more than 25 per cent of cases - seven in more than half of 
cases and two in more than 75 per cent. We have seen that this is an important reason that disputes 
are not pursued even prior to litigation, but it is much more prominent at the litigation stage. 
Compensation was not of great significance, but again was more important than prior to litigation: 
six of the 16 lawyer participants with experience of challenge mentioned this with two considering it 
a factor in more than 25 per cent of cases. Conversely, and unsurprisingly, lawyers indicated that 
action short of correction or compensation is much less relevant at this later stage.214 The limited 
experiences of suppliers and procuring entities supported these conclusions.215 
 
Another factor of some significance at this stage was use of legal proceedings to pressure the 
procuring entity, with little intention of completing proceedings. Eleven of 16 lawyers with 
experience of challenge mentioned this, although only five said that it was relevant in more than 25 
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 Thus only four of the 16 lawyer participants with experience of challenge said that this was relevant (two in 
26-50 per cent of cases and two in fewer than 25 per cent of cases). 
215
 Thus the supplier with challenge experience said corrective action had been relevant in two cases and 
compensation in one. Likewise of procuring entities with litigation experience, three indicated that corrective 
action had been relevant, with one mentioning compensation and another ‘other’ action. 
per cent of cases.216 Two 16 considered that this has become more important, one suggesting that 
automatic suspension now created “a perceived likelihood that the authority will then fold”.  
 
Certain factors relating to the remedies system were also mentioned as relevant. However, these 
factors were not as important as the above reasons and not nearly as important as they were in 
deterring litigation in the first place.  
 
In this regard, cost was mentioned by 12 of the 16 lawyer participants, but with only four 
considering it relevant in more than 25 per cent of cases. This is unsurprising, since proceedings 
might expected only if the cost of pursuing them to the end is justified – although in some cases, as 
we have seen, proceedings may be instituted merely as a pressure tactic. The desire to concentrate 
resources elsewhere was also mentioned by lawyers, but only by a few217 and again was much less 
relevant at this stage. Delay caused by proceedings was not a significant influence at all at this 
stage.218 Likewise, one or two lawyers mentioned that difficulties with legal remedies were a reason 
for not proceeding in a limited number of cases, but this factor was again of negligible significance at 
this stage and much more influential at the earlier stage of bringing proceedings, as might be 
expected when the decision to litigate is based on legal advice. 
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 The supplier with litigation experience said this was not a factor; of the four procuring entities with 
litigation experience three considered this relevant (all in more than half of instances). 
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 Seven of 16 lawyers, with five indicating it relevant in 25 per cent of cases or fewer. 
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 Four of 16 lawyer participants with three indicating it relevant in 25 per cent of cases or fewer. The supplier 
with experience of legal challenge mentioned cost as relevant in one case, and all three of the above factors 
were each mentioned by one procuring entity. 
Other reasons for terminating were lack of evidence of a breach,219 and perceived low or uncertain 
chances of success because of legal uncertainty.220 As we saw above, both are also significant in 
explaining why suppliers do not seek legal advice or make legal challenges in the first place and are 
more significant at that earlier stage. However, it seems these considerations might become clearer 
once proceedings have commenced – although withdrawal for these reasons could also occur when 
litigation is purely tactical.  
 
Finally, we saw above that, as with financial cost, fear of reprisals, in particular from other public 
sector entities, is the most significant reason – along with cost and other difficulties with the 
remedies system - why suppliers with complaints do not institute proceedings. However, lawyers’ 
responses indicated that suppliers’ fear of reprisals – whether from the procuring entity, other 
regulated entities, or the wider market – is (as with cost) a much less significant reason for 
terminating a dispute after launch of proceedings. However, it was still mentioned as relevant by a 
few lawyers.221 
 
d) Factors affecting the level of legal challenge and complaints over time 
The study also examined the influence on complaints and challenge activity of the changes to the EU 
remedies regime that took effect in 2009, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and the 
recent recession. Lawyers were asked to assess the impact of specified changes. Suppliers - both 
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 Cited by 12 of 16 lawyers commenting, with seven of these considering it relevant in more than 25 per cent 
of cases and three in more than half.   
220
 10 of 16 lawyers with experience of legal challenge in the former case, and seven in the latter, mentioned 
these. Legal uncertainty was mentioned by the supplier with litigation experience whilst two procuring entities 
mentioned lack of factual evidence and one legal uncertainty. 
221
 And the supplier with litigation experience mentioned fear of reprisals from other regulated purchasers as a 
factor. 
those with experience of litigation and/or complaints (26) and those without (88) - were asked to 
comment on how these factors had (or would be expected to) influence them. Procuring entities 
were presented with a similar question in relation to experience of legal challenge (relevant to four 
entities) and/or complaints short of legal challenge (relevant for 36).222 Participants were also asked 
to identify other relevant changes. 
 
The data indicates that the vast majority of suppliers are aware of the standstill requirement, 
automatic suspension and FOIA, and that all have increased the likelihood of both complaints and 
challenge, thus helping to explain the observed increase in litigation and requests for legal advice 
(although for the majority of individual suppliers they have had no effect). On the other hand, the 
ineffectiveness remedy is less known and influential, while the impact of the recession appears 
largely neutral.  
 
So far as standstill is concerned, only seven of 111 suppliers responding did not know of this, and 
one-third223 considered it likely or very likely to increase legal challenge224 - although two-thirds 
thought it would make no difference and three that it decreased the risk of challenge.225 14 of the 18 
lawyers also considered this to have increased the likelihood of legal challenge, two considering it 
made challenge much more likely (although three considered it reduced the likelihood of challenge). 
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 Suppliers and procuring entities received a brief explanation of the legal factors (e.g. Ineffectiveness is “A 
remedy introduced in 2009 allowing the courts to set aside concluded contracts in certain situations”), with an 
option of indicating that they did not know what it was, as well as options for indicating its significance or that 
they did not know this. 
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 Of those able to assess this – 14 could not. 
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 29, including the one with experience of challenge. 
225
 None had experience of legal challenge. 
Sixteen of the 18 lawyers and 23226 of 110 suppliers also considered that the standstill increased the 
likelihood of complaints falling short of legal challenge.227  
 
Of the suppliers responding228 90 per cent229 knew what automatic suspension was - a level of 
awareness only slightly lower than for standstill – and of those who made an assessment230 about 20 
per cent231  considered that it likely or very likely to increase the likelihood of challenge or complaint 
(although, as with the standstill, the majority (around 70 per cent)232 thought it would make no 
difference). About two thirds of lawyers thought it had increased the likelihood of both complaints 
and legal challenge.233  
 
Seven of 18 lawyers stated that FOIA has increased the likelihood of legal challenge (although two 
stated considered it made challenge less likely) and 10 that it has increased the likelihood of 
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 Only seven had complaints experience. 26 of the 110 either did not know about standstill (12) or could not 
assess the impact (13); 57 thought it had no effect; and five that it made complaints less likely. 
227
 None considered that it decreased the likelihood of complaints, the other two considering that it had no 
effect. 
228
 111 responding in relation to legal challenge and 106 in relation to complaints short of legal challenge. 
229
 10/111 in relation to legal challenge (none with experience of legal challenge) and 16/106 in relation to 
complaints (four with actual experience of complaints). 
230
 About 85 per cent of respondents. 
231
 17/82 commenting in relation to legal challenge (none with experience of challenge) and 18/75 in relation 
to complaints. 
232
 59/83 in relation to legal challenge and 55/75 in relation to complaints. 
233
 13 of 18 of the lawyers 12 of 18 respectively. The other five and six respectively considered it had no effect. 
complaints falling short of challenge. Of suppliers responding, again only a very few234 did not know 
what the Act was. Of those making an assessment,235 about a quarter and a fifth considered that it 
would be likely or very likely to increase challenge or complaints respectively236 although again the 
majority did not think it would affect decisions and about 10 per cent that it decreased the risk of 
challenge.237  
 
The ineffectiveness remedy has had a less significant impact than other changes, as might be 
expected given its limited availability. This was also the least known reform, with roughly 30 per cent 
of suppliers responding not knowing about it.238 13 of the 18 lawyers considered that it has not 
increased the likelihood of legal challenge and 11 that it has not increased the likelihood of 
complaints, although the others – a significant minority - disagreed. Supplier responses likewise 
indicated that some were more likely to take action because of this remedy, although not so many 
as with the other reforms.239  
 
As regards the recession, as noted above this seems to have cut both ways. Lawyers considered this 
as important as any of the individual changes above to the remedies system, if not more important, 
in increasing likelihood of litigation (15 of 18 citing this) and complaints (17/18): “Suppliers are more 
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 6/111 in relation to legal challenge (none had experience of legal challenge) and 10/107 in relation to 
complaints. 
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 Again about 85 per cent. 
236
 25/92 in relation to legal challenge and 20/84 in relation to complaints short of legal challenge. 
237
 9/92 in relation to legal challenge and 8/84 in relation to complaints short of legal challenge. 
238
 34/110 in relation to legal challenge and 27/107 in relation to complaints short of legal challenge. 
239
 About 15 per cent of suppliers could not assess its significance; of the others 15 per cent thought it would 
affect their decision to challenge and less than 20 per cent thought it would affect their decision to complain 
or seek advice. Around 85 per cent thought it would make no difference in either case.  
likely to pick over the detail of losing a contract as their business may have declined somewhat due 
to the recession”. Use of larger frameworks and other aggregation measures were mentioned by 
several e.g.: “In certain specialist fields…authorities are seeking to consolidate contracts, purchase 
jointly and drive down costs, often with longer term partnering arrangements, therefore losing a 
tender means a much bigger loss of market share”. Around 15 per cent of suppliers making an 
assessment also thought the recession made challenges and complaints more, or much more, 
likely.240 Interestingly, however, whilst only two lawyers considered that the recession had made 
challenge less likely, the proportion of suppliers who did so was much closer to the proportion who 
considered it would have the opposite effect – about 10 per cent241 (although  again the vast 
majority thought it made no difference).242 The difference between lawyers’ and supplier’s 
perceptions might be because lawyers’ experience relates to suppliers who have sought legal advice, 
whilst other may have been deterred from acting by recession-related factors.  
 
As for other factors, seven lawyers and two suppliers mentioned greater supplier awareness of rights 
and remedies, four lawyers referred to success of past challenges and five to awareness of 
competitors’ willingness to challenge; thus challenges may perhaps increase if a culture of litigation 
becomes established. Five lawyers also mentioned that procuring entities’ greater responsiveness to 
legal challenge was a factor in increased litigation.  
 
e) Reasons for supplier inactivity 
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 15/92 in relation to legal challenge and 13/91 in relation to complaints short of challenge. 
241
 10/92 in relation to legal challenge and 9/91 in relation to complaints. 
242
 67/92 in relation to legal challenge and 69/91 in relation to complaints. 
Thus far we have focused on suppliers who complain. However, an important part of the overall 
picture is the behaviour of those suppliers who do not take action. This could be because they do not 
consider that there are any violations or because they decline to act on them.  
 
Nearly two-thirds of responding suppliers (74 of 114) had not, in fact, perceived any violations, and 
of those who had, for most this was merely one or two, or a few, incidences, although all were 
involved in seeking business with regulated entities.243 This data may actually under-represent the 
number of satisfied suppliers, as disgruntled suppliers may be more likely to respond to the 
questionnaire. This is consistent with the findings of Pachnou that a significant reason for limited 
litigation in the UK is a general trust in the integrity of the process.244 On the other hand, the 
response of the one supplier with extensive experience of complaints (“too many to recall”) 
presented a different perspective, suggesting that that “Every procurement exercise we have been 
involved in over nearly 15 years has been challengable [sic] to some degree or other". It may be that 
this perception is informed by extensive knowledge of the law that allows the supplier to identify 
breaches that may be regarded as technical, rather than substantive (in the sense of impacting on 
fairness); the former may not be even suspected as unlawful by other suppliers. However, another 
supplier, that had had concerns in four cases, also commented, that “we have strong suspicions that 
many projects are defined in such a way as to prejudge/pre-select the winner”; and the limited 
evidence from the Commission’s remedies study (based on a sample of just 55 suppliers) suggested 
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 It is not known exactly how many of the 74 suppliers with no concerns had been involved in award 
procedures and/or how frequently but information given in the questionnaires showed that at least 42 had 
been involved and one definitely had not. 
244
 Pachnou, n 189 above. 
less trust in procurement procedures than in some Member States245 (although, as the Commission 
points out, this is not consistent with other data on trust in UK government).246 Thus our study 
indicates that satisfaction with procedures affects the overall pattern of supplier behaviour but that 
satisfaction is far from universal; and, whilst this could provide part of the explanation for the 
difference in litigation levels between the UK and other states, further comparative research is 
needed.  
 
What of cases in which possible breaches were perceived but no action taken?  
 
We noted that 40 of 114 suppliers completing the questionnaire had perceived legal violations. Of 
these, 24 had encountered perceived violations over which they decided not to act.247 Nine of these 
had taken action over some violations, leaving just 15 that had not taken action over any of 
perceived violations - thus a good majority (25 of 40) felt able at least to complain to the procuring 
entity. Overall, less than 15 per cent of the responding group had both perceived breaches and had 
not taken action in at least some cases.  
 
Of the 24 who had perceived breaches but decided not to act, 20 provided requested information on 
the number and timing of breaches. Nearly all referred to one or two violations only, although some 
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 55 per cent cited lack of trust as a reason for not participating in public procurement and 43 per cent cited 
it as a reason for dissatisfaction with outcomes: see Commission remedies report, n 9 above, appendices, 19-
20. 
246
 Commission remedies report, n 9 above, 75. 
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 Nearly all had only perceived only one violation (five suppliers) or two, or at most a handful. 
had encountered many more. These 24 suppliers were asked to assess the relevance of certain 
defined reasons for not acting,248 as well as to note any additional reasons.  
 
The main reasons for not acting at all were the same as the reasons that suppliers did not pursue 
complaints by seeking legal advice and/or instituting proceedings.249 Thus most important, and of 
similar importance, were the cost of legal challenge, with 20 of 23 who made an assessment citing 
this, and 14 of 20 also citing the need to use resources elsewhere; and fear reprisals from the 
procuring entity or others, referred to by nearly all responding suppliers.250  
 
In addition, often no action was taken because the supplier perceived it had a weak or uncertain 
legal case: the vast majority had been influenced by a perceived low chance of success for reasons 
other than the absence of a violation (17 of 20); legal uncertainty (13 of 20); or difficulty establishing 
the facts (11 of 20). Factors relating to the remedies system other than cost and use of resources 
were also cited, 16 of 21 citing the fact that they did not consider that they would obtain suitable 
remedies and 12 of 21 the time that legal proceedings would take.  
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 Again, suppliers were asked to assess the significance of each factor by reference to a defined percentage 
range of cases in which they were relevant, but since the vast majority of suppliers were referring to one or a 
very limited of incidences the text below will refer only to the simple fact of whether the suppliers considered 
the reason in question to be relevant or not relevant in any cases. 
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 Other listed factors were considered irrelevant or of limited importance: corrective action by the procuring 
entity (cited by two of 18), compensation (mentioned by none of 18), other remedial action (mentioned by 
four of 19) the trivial nature of the breach (five of 17), the fact that the organisation itself benefited from the 
breach (three of 18) and that the contract was not seen as sufficiently important (six of 19). 
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 21 of 22 making an assessment referred to the first in relation to both the current and future contracts, 
with 19 of 22 noting possible reprisals from other regulated entities and 14/22 to the wider market. 
Interestingly, 11 of 18 suppliers also referred to a non-confrontational legal culture - indicating that 
this is even more important at the stage of deciding whether to complain at all than in deciding 
whether to pursue a legal challenge.251 Twelve of 19 also considered breaches a natural business risk 
not worth legal action. 
 
5) Conclusion 
We have seen that from 2007-2014 there was an upward trend in the number of reported court 
judgments in the UK (final or otherwise), and also in the incidence of litigation generally, with many 
cases settled or withdrawn because of, inter alia, corrective measures. Alongside this, there was a 
largely parallel increase in the number of suppliers and procuring entities seeking external legal 
advice over disputes. Our study indicates that recent EU reforms have influenced this trend, in 
particular the standstill obligation and automatic suspension, as has the domestic Freedom of 
information Act; and that all these reforms have also made it more likely for suppliers to complain to 
the procuring entity itself. The EU’s ineffectiveness remedy is less well-known and less significant, 
but this is unsurprising given that it applies to only to a few types of violation. 
 
Despite these developments, however, the numbers of suppliers taking legal action or seeking legal 
advice remains low. The study sheds some light on the reasons for this, although how far these 
factors account for differences with other Member States remains speculative. In so far as these 
reasons relate to the nature of the national remedies system, the findings also provide empirical 
support for arguments that some features of the system do not comply with EU requirements and 
that some attention should be given to alternative approaches to enforcement. 
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 Where, as explained, it was cited by slightly under half. 
First, our study suggests that a significant proportion of responding suppliers have no concerns over 
legal violations, and for these the nature and availability of legal remedies is not an issue. There is no 
evidence to judge whether the reality or perception of violations is different from the position in 
other Member States and how far, if at all, such a difference helps to explain the low level of 
litigation, but this would be an interesting subject for examination. 
 
What, however, of those suppliers that have perceived violations? 
 
We saw, first, that many such suppliers decide not to litigate or even complain, and that the two 
main reasons are fear of reprisals and the cost or inadequacy of legal remedies. Secondly, we saw 
that when suppliers do complain, including with legal advice, the main reasons for not ultimately 
litigating are again both the costs (financial and resource costs) and remedial difficulties; and fear of 
reprisals.  
 
The fact that costs of litigation are high and a significant obstacle to legal action could help explain 
the low level of litigation as compared with other Member States (although other factors, such as 
the level of corrective action, might be relevant). The findings on cost also provide empirical support 
for the argument that, in light of the case law on access to justice, the UK remedies system does not 
comply with the EU Remedies Directive unless legal aid is made available. Since, as explained, 
domestic legislation provides for legal aid where there would otherwise be non-compliance, UK law 
actually complies with EU obligations, but a conclusion that legal aid must be available in principle 
could have important implications for procurement litigation, as well as financial implications for 
legal aid funding. This may make it advisable to consider other enforcement solutions. These could 
include a cheaper system of judicial-type redress, such as a tribunal (an option recently rejected in 
Scotland, however),252 that would comply the Remedies Directive; establishment of an (optional)253 
first-instance review system that does not necessarily itself comply with the standards of the 
Remedies Directive (but could allow for appeal to a body that does); or informal enforcement 
mechanisms, such as the “Mystery Shopper” service for investigating complaints254 (recently been 
strengthened and put on a statutory basis),255 which could relieve pressure on the EU–compliant 
system and/or improve enforcement.  Examination of such options is beyond the scope of this 
article, but in light of our findings on the limitations on the legal remedies system would be an 
interesting subject for research. 
 
As regards the detail of remedies, the most important obstacle has been the rules on time limits for 
proceedings, but these were never compliant with EU law and were amended in 2011 (although it is 
not yet known whether this has improved access to remedies). The most significant remaining 
problem is the difficulty of securing suspension in view of the adequacy of damages rule, 
undertaking in damages requirement, and practical application of the balance of interests test. We 
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 The Scottish Government, Changes to the public procurement rules in Scotland consultation - an analysis of 
the responses (August 2015) available at http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/08/1618/downloads, 71-78 
and 82. 
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 Provision for compulsory external review is probably not permitted (C-410/01 Fritsch, Chiari & Partner, 
Ziviltechniker GmbH v Österreichische Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG (ASFINAG) [2003] 
ECR I-06413) although the amending Remedies Directive clarifies that review before the procuring entity may 
be a pre-condition of independent review: see Article 1(5) of the amended Remedies Directive 89/665. 
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 See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/mystery-shopper-results#about-the-mystery-shopper-
scheme. See also Cabinet Office, Scope and remit of the Mystery Shopper Scheme (2012) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mystery-shopper-scope-and-remit. 
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 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s.40, which includes specific statutory powers to 
obtain documents and information from procuring entities to assist investigations. 
have argued that these features of the system may also (as with the old rules on time limits) violate 
the effectiveness requirement. This position is again reinforced by this empirical evidence of the 
influence of these requirements on litigation, although these obstacles are not nearly as important 
in practice as the previous (now repealed) time-limits for proceedings.  
 
Suppliers were also clear that fear of reprisals from the regulated sector (although not the wider 
market) was a real issue and rated it of equal importance with problems with remedies, the vast 
majority considering it this a factor in all or most situations. It is impossible to say to what extent 
these fears are well-founded but they are very real. This has even been perceived as a problem with 
the less formal Mystery Shopper service.256 This seems an inevitable limitation of any system of legal 
remedies or indeed other supplier-based action. How the UK compares in this regard with other 
Member States is not known, although the problem might be exacerbated by the UK’s absence of a 
tradition of remedies, the significant costs of invoking the system, and the non-confrontational 
culture (which also contributed significantly to a reluctance to complain or litigate). The importance 
of this factor indicates that enforcement measures other than legal remedies or supplier-based 
complaints might be valuable, and in this light a recent initiative to develop more of a pro-active 
function for the Mystery Shopper Service257 may prove important, as may the new duty in the 2014 
EU procurement directives to monitor for compliance.258 
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 See Growing your business – a report on growing microbusinesses, Lord Young (May 2013) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/198165/growing-your-
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 E.g. Directive 2014/24/EU, n 1 above, art.83(2). 
We have also seen that it is a frequent occurrence that a supplier complaint – and especially 
litigation – leads to action by the procuring entity. This includes, in particular correction of the 
breach - such as might otherwise be obtained via legal remedies - and action such as apologies or 
changing policies for the future, although compensation (also provided by the remedies system) 
plays only a small role in settling complaints, even those leading to legal challenge. There is no 
information on other Member States to help assess whether action by procuring entities contributes 
to the low level of UK litigation. It might be expected that more effective remedies would lead to 
even more corrective action.  
 
Overall, the picture is that recent reforms have led to greater use of remedies and more complaints 
and have improved effectiveness of remedies in practical terms in the UK in accordance with their 
objectives. However, important obstacles to the use of legal remedies remain, and in several 
respects there are issues around compliance with EU requirements. This suggests a possible need to 
consider a different approach to supplier enforcement in this field and this is an area in which future 
research would be particularly timely. 
